Post by account_disabled on Mar 12, 2024 1:55:58 GMT -5
The target of zero primary deficit it is necessary to apply the prohibitions arising from its non-compliance in a systematic and contextualized manner so that the Brazilian system itself which strives for the maximum effectiveness of fundamental rights is not compromised. .
As we talked about six years ago in this Contas à Vista Phone Number Data column on the occasion of the th anniversary of LC it is symptomatic that article of the ADCT — incorporated by Amendment — has hardly innovated in relation to its counterpart set of sanctions and prohibitions described in articles and of the LRF. Likewise the consequences provided for in article of LC refer to the sanctions provided for in article -A of the Constitution which in turn reiterate the logic of their normative equivalents just mentioned. Almost equal sanctions that were not applied by fire and iron previously do not tend to be applied now and in the coming years. It is ironic to remember that fiscal rules are repeated and overlapped without in fact improving the quality of budget execution to make it more in line with government planning.
The tendency as occurred with the LRF and Amendment sanctions is for there to be more noise than stoppages and blockages in the achievement of ordinary public policies which are supported by the principle of continuity of public services. The contractionary agenda – although it is noisy and somewhat arrogant for promising intense and rapid adjustments – is not capable of redesigning the Brazilian legal system through mere fiscal voluntarism.
In fact nothing is more symptomatic of its failure than the unrestrained growth of parliamentary amendments that are inattentive to the sectoral planning of public policies after all the imposition of severe limits on scarcity does not automatically and miraculously deliver the much desired and necessary quality of public spending in which obviously includes tax expenditure.
The most interesting thing about this process of likely activation of the commonly called “triggers” of article -A of the Constitution with the imminent failure to meet the primary result target will be the discrediting of the self-imposed budgetary rigidity itself in a somewhat irrational way as it has underestimated the evidence of its factual-normative unfeasibility. This is by the way my most sincere wish for the Brazilian fiscal scenario of : impossible promises are not credible and such a finding in the fiscal field sooner or later will reveal itself crystal clear for the entire society no matter how that some try to hide it or distort it at the cost of a painful and colossal contingency.
As we talked about six years ago in this Contas à Vista Phone Number Data column on the occasion of the th anniversary of LC it is symptomatic that article of the ADCT — incorporated by Amendment — has hardly innovated in relation to its counterpart set of sanctions and prohibitions described in articles and of the LRF. Likewise the consequences provided for in article of LC refer to the sanctions provided for in article -A of the Constitution which in turn reiterate the logic of their normative equivalents just mentioned. Almost equal sanctions that were not applied by fire and iron previously do not tend to be applied now and in the coming years. It is ironic to remember that fiscal rules are repeated and overlapped without in fact improving the quality of budget execution to make it more in line with government planning.
The tendency as occurred with the LRF and Amendment sanctions is for there to be more noise than stoppages and blockages in the achievement of ordinary public policies which are supported by the principle of continuity of public services. The contractionary agenda – although it is noisy and somewhat arrogant for promising intense and rapid adjustments – is not capable of redesigning the Brazilian legal system through mere fiscal voluntarism.
In fact nothing is more symptomatic of its failure than the unrestrained growth of parliamentary amendments that are inattentive to the sectoral planning of public policies after all the imposition of severe limits on scarcity does not automatically and miraculously deliver the much desired and necessary quality of public spending in which obviously includes tax expenditure.
The most interesting thing about this process of likely activation of the commonly called “triggers” of article -A of the Constitution with the imminent failure to meet the primary result target will be the discrediting of the self-imposed budgetary rigidity itself in a somewhat irrational way as it has underestimated the evidence of its factual-normative unfeasibility. This is by the way my most sincere wish for the Brazilian fiscal scenario of : impossible promises are not credible and such a finding in the fiscal field sooner or later will reveal itself crystal clear for the entire society no matter how that some try to hide it or distort it at the cost of a painful and colossal contingency.